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Abstract
We introduce call externalities in the standard model of network
competition with termination-based price discrimination, and employ
a simple graphical analysis to study the outcome of competition. In
contrast to recent results in the literature, we ¯nd that even under
linear pricing, access charges below marginal cost are used as a collu-
sion device, while o®-net prices are above on-net prices in equilibrium.
Moreover, \bill and keep" arrangements may be welfare improving
compared with cost-based access pricing.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Literature Overview
The telecommunications industry has undergone rapid change in several as-
pects during the last years. Many countries have experienced exorbitantly
high growth rates in the mobile telephony market. This has shifted the fo-
cus of research in telecommunications to markets characterized by two-way
interconnection. In such a market, competing service providers are intercon-
nected, and part of their service consists of terminating calls that originate
on their rivals' networks. Since this is costly, ¯rms collect per-minute access
charges from each other for termination. These access charges are usually
negotiated on a reciprocal basis, and regulatory intervention is only necessary
if negotiations fail.
In the second half of the 1990s, serious concerns have been raised in
the literature about ¯rms' ability to use a cooperatively determined access
charge as a collusion device. The ¯rst to show the negative welfare e®ects
of cooperatively determined access charges within an explicit model were
Armstrong (1998) and La®ont et al. (1998a, 1998b) { henceforth LRTa and
LRTb. They employ models where two networks are di®erentiated in the
Hotelling style and compete for customers in prices. The models of LRTa
and LRTb, for uniform pricing and termination-based price discrimination,
respectively, are by now widely accepted as the \standard models" of two-way
interconnection, and most of the subsequent literature uses them as a starting
2point. These models predicts that under a linear pricing rule, the negotiated
access charge is used as a collusive device and exceeds the marginal cost of
access.
Subsequently, however, it has been shown that also access pricing be-
low marginal cost may be the outcome of competition, if networks compete
in two-part tari®s with discriminatory prices (Gans and King, 2001), if de-
mand for subscription is elastic (Dessein, 2003, Schi®, 2002), or if ex-ante
investments have to be made (Cambini and Valletti, 2003). Gans and King
(2001) also conclude that the widespread \bill and keep" arrangements, cor-
responding to a zero access charge, may be used to soften price competition,
and hence are undesirable from the consumers' perspective. This view is
reinforced by the results of Dessein (2003).
1.2 Call Externalities
All of the papers discussed above share the assumption that only the caller
bene¯ts from a call, but not the receiver. This is obviously not the case. The
fact that a call generates utility also for the receiver has been recognized, but
nonetheless widely neglected in the literature.1
In this paper we introduce call externalities into LRTb. As we show, this
has a signi¯cant e®ect in the presence of termination-based price discrimi-
nation.2 The reason for this is that if consumers care about being called,
1See the discussion in Hahn (2003). Call externalities are only studied in the context of
a receiver pays system, e.g. Kim and Lim (2001), Jeon et al. (2003), or DeGraba (2003).
2Under nondiscriminatory pricing the analysis of competition remains unchanged, see
Armstrong (2002). The only impact of call externalities then lies in the judgement of
3networks set higher o®-net prices to make subscription to the rival less at-
tractive. In order to bring down these o®-net rates below the monopoly
price, the negotiated access charge will often be set below cost. Nevertheless,
contrary to Gans and King's (2001) results, on-net prices are below o®-net
prices, and \bill and keep" might even be welfare improving, compared to
cost based access pricing.
Another novelty of the current approach is that we derive all the compar-
ative statics results from a simple graphical analysis. This greatly facilitates
the understanding of the model, and also allows us to clarify two small mis-
takes in LRTb.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce the model, existence of equilibrium is derived in Section 3, and the
graphical analysis is carried out in Section 4. We present some comparative
statics results in Section 5 and turn to the collusive role of the access charge
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with a discussion.
2 The Model
There are two networks, labeled 1 and 2. The marginal cost of originating
or terminating a call is c0, and therefore the total marginal cost of a call is
c = 2c0. The reciprocal unit access charge is a ¸ ¡c0.3 Networks compete in
linear prices pii (for on-net calls within network i) and pij (for o®-net calls
welfare implications.
3If the access charge were smaller, a network could generate pro¯ts by installing a
computer which permanently calls into the rival network.
4originating in network i).4
From the consumers' point of view the networks are horizontally di®er-
entiated in a Hotelling style. The networks are located at the end points
x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 and each consumer is located at some address x 2 [0;1].
The total number of consumers, normalized to 1, is distributed uniformly
on this interval. The degree of horizontal di®erentiation is measured by the
\transport costs" t. A consumer located at x faces a disutility of tjx ¡ xij if
he subscribes to network i. The utility derived from an active call of length
q is given by the function u(q) speci¯ed below. Consumers also bene¯t from
receiving calls. The utility of receiving a call (passive utility) of length q is
¹ u(q). A consumer with income y, subscribed to network i and located at x,
deriving utility u from active and ¹ u from passive calls, enjoys a total utility
of v0+y+u+ ¹ u¡tjx¡xij, where v0 is some (large) ¯xed surplus from being
connected.
The timing is as follows. First, a reciprocal access charge is chosen,
either by the regulator, or by a cooperative agreement of the networks. Then
networks set on- and o®-net prices. Consumers subscribe to a network and
choose their call volume. Let demand be q(p) = argmaxqfu(q)¡pqg, writing
qij short for the demand for on- and o®-net calls q(pij). Denoting net surplus
by v(p) = maxqfu(q)¡pqg, and given the market shares ®1 and ®2 = 1¡®1,
network i o®ers its subscribers a total net surplus of wi = ®i[v(pii)+¹ u(qii)]+
4In Berger (2004), we also provide an analysis of the nonlinear pricing case, i.e., the
Gans and King (2001) framework, with call externalities. However, this does not yield
qualitative results substantially di®erent from theirs, and hence is not included here.
5®j[v(pij) + ¹ u(qji)], where fi;jg = f1;2g. Letting hij = v(pij) + ¹ u(qji), we
may write
wi = ®ihii + ®jhij: (1)
3 Equilibria
For ¯xed prices, a consumer equilibrium is given if the market shares are
such that no consumer has an incentive to unilaterally switch to the other
network. In a shared market equilibrium, the consumer located at x = ®1
is indi®erent between the networks. The market share ®1 = ® can thus be
calculated from the indi®erence condition w1¡t® = w2¡t(1¡®), and reads
® = 1
2 +¾(w1 ¡w2), where ¾ = (2t)¡1 measures the substitutability between





with Hi = 1=2 + ¾(hij ¡ hjj). For a shared market equilibrium to exist, H1
and H2 must have the same sign, and following the analysis in LRTb, we
conclude that it is stable, if H1 and H2 are positive.
Imagine prices are ¯xed and a stable consumer equilibrium has been re-
alized. If in this situation neither network can gain by unilaterally changing
its prices or ¯xed charge (taking into account the in°uence on the consumer
equilibrium), then these values constitute a network equilibrium. For the
remainder of this paper we concentrate on symmetric network equilibria.
6For given prices and a corresponding stable consumer equilibrium ®, pro¯t
of network 1 is given by
¼1 = ®
2(p11 ¡ c)q11 + ®(1 ¡ ®)[(p12 ¡ c)q12 + (a ¡ c0)(q21 ¡ q12)];
and an analogous equation holds for ¼2. If we write Mij = [pij ¡ c(1 +
m)]qij +mcqji for the unit pro¯t of network i (the pro¯t a single customer of
network i generates with one active call to and one passive call from network
j), denoting by m = (a ¡ c0)=c > ¡1 the (relative) markup on access, pro¯t
of network i can also be written in the form ¼1 = ®2M11 + ®(1 ¡ ®)M12.
Taking into account that Mii depends only on pii, the ¯rst order conditions
























(1 ¡ 2®)M12 = 0;
and the respective equations for network 2. At a symmetric shared mar-
ket equilibrium, where p11 = p22, p12 = p21, and ® = 1=2, the ¯rst order

















We now invoke LRTb's explicit utility function u(q) =
q1¡1=´
1¡1=´, with ´ > 1,
which yields the constant elasticity demand function q(p) = p¡´, indirect
utility u(q(p)) =
´
´¡1p1¡´, net surplus v(p) = 1
´¡1p1¡´, and a monopoly price5




´¡1. Furthermore, we assume that the utility from passive calls
is a ¯xed fraction ¯ ¸ 0 of the utility from active calls: ¹ u(q) = ¯u(q).
With these speci¯cations, inserting from (2) and rearranging terms, the ¯rst


































We have intentionally written these equations so as to describe the reciprocal
value of the o®-net price as a function of the reciprocal value of the on-net
price. This allows us to draw the graphs of the two functions, and ¯nd all
symmetric candidate equilibria as points of intersection of the corresponding
curves.
The next proposition establishes the existence of a unique, stable, sym-
metric equilibrium for low substitutability. The proof relies on the quasi-
concavity of the pro¯t function in the limit as ¾ ! 0. It is analogous to the
proof of Proposition 1 in LRTb, and hence not presented here.6
Proposition 1 For given access charge, if ¾ is small enough, there exists a
unique, stable, symmetric equilibrium. Its price constellation is given by the
intersection of (3) and the downward sloping part of (4).
6The result is slightly di®erent from LRTb's, however. Note that the call externality
prevents the existence of equilibrium in the case of too high substitutability even for a = c0.
8In the following we will analyze the graphs of (3) and (4) more closely,
allowing us to derive quickly and easily a variety of comparative statics re-
sults.
4 Graphical Analysis
Let us ¯rst have a closer look at (3). The right hand side of this equation
is an a±ne linear function of p
¡1
11 , which depends on the parameters m, ´,
and ¯, but not on ¾. Its slope decreases with ¯, falling from (1 + m)¡1 for
¯ = 0 to zero for ¯ = 1=´ and approaching ¡(1 + m)¡1 for ¯ ! 1. At the
monopoly price p11 = pM, we have p
¡1
12 = 1
(1+m)pM, which is independent of ¯.
Graphically this means that by increasing the relative importance ¯ of passive











. Note that without the call externality, i.e.
for ¯ = 0, equation (3) reduces to p12 = (1 + m)p11, the proportionality rule
from LRTb. For ¯´ = 1, the line (3) is horizontal at p12 = (1 + m)pM.
If we increase the access charge a, and hence the markup m, holding all
other parameters ¯xed, the line (3) rotates clockwisely (if its slope is positive,






, where it intersects the horizontal axis. In both cases the
equilibrium moves downwards7 along the curve (4).
7It cannot reach the horizontal axis, however, since the point of intersection of (3)
with this axis is always either on the negative side or to the right of 2=c, i.e. outside
the relevant region c < p11 < pM. Hence, their is no scope for connectivity breakdown,
meaning p12 ! 1, contrary to Jeon et al.'s (2004) result for the nonlinear pricing case.
9Turning to (4), we can see that this equation does not involve a, the
access charge. Whenever 1=(´ ¡ 1) is not an integer, the right hand side of
(4) is de¯ned only if the expression in square brackets is nonnegative. The
second term of this expression is a negative constant, it does not depend
on p11. The ¯rst term is positive for p11 < pM and { viewed as a function
of p
¡1
11 { downward sloping from its vertical asymptote at p11 = pM to its
minimum at p11 = c. For p
¡1
11 > c¡1 the function given by (4) is strictly
increasing and unbounded, its slope converging to ´¡1=(´¡1) for p
¡1
11 ! 1.
Furthermore, this function is convex at least for values of p11 slightly below
pM. The second term in square brackets shifts the curve up (for ¾ ! 1)
or down (for ¾ ! 0). Since (4) has a negative slope in the relevant region
c < p11 < pM, there exists at most one point of intersection with (3), if the
slope of this line is nonnegative, i.e. if ¯´ · 1. If ¯ exceeds 1=´, the slope
of (3) is negative, and there exist two points of intersection. However, the
second point is outside the relevant region if ¾ is small.
From now on we concentrate on the case where substitutability is low
enough to guarantee existence of a unique stable equilibrium. We then ask,
in which way the equilibrium depends on the parameters of the model. All
the results are derived using the graphical analysis applied to Figure 1.
5 Comparative Statics
The next lemma shows that while the on-net price always decreases with




































Figure 1: The curve given by (4) and three di®erent positions of the line (3):
(i) collusive choice of a, (ii) cost based access pricing, (iii) socially optimal
choice of a. Here, ¯´ > 1.
price depends on the strength of the call externality and on the elasticity of
demand. On the other hand, an increase in the access charge always lowers
the on-net price and raises the o®-net price.
Lemma 1 (i) The on-net price decreases with ¾ and the o®-net price de-
creases with ¾ if ¯´ < 1, increases with ¾ if ¯´ > 1, and is constant at
p12 = (1 + m)pM if ¯´ = 1.
(ii) The on-net price decreases in a, while the o®-net price increases in a.
Proof: An increase in ¾ shifts the graph of (4) upwards and does not
in°uence the graph of (3). The point of intersection thus moves to the right,
11i.e. p
¡1
11 increases. The vertical direction of movement depends on the slope
of (3). If ¯´ < 1 (this includes the LRTb case ¯ = 0), the slope is positive, so
also p
¡1
12 increases. If ¯´ > 1 the slope is negative and the intersection point
moves down, and if ¯´ = 1 the line is horizontal at p
¡1
12 = [(1 + m)pM]¡1.
Increasing a or, equivalently, m, shifts the line (3) downwards. Since (4)
slopes downward in the relevant region, the point of intersection moves down
and to the right. This means p11 falls and p12 rises. QED
In contrast to the result in LRTb,8 more substitutability exerts upward
pressure on the o®-net price, if ¯ is large enough. Intuitively, if the call
externality induced negative e®ect of an increasing o®-net price on the rival's
customers is large, higher substitutability creates incentives for the networks
to exploit this e®ect and raise the o®-net price while lowering the on-net price
to compensate their own customers.
6 The Collusive Role of the Access Charge
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 states that varying the access charge results in the
equilibrium prices moving in opposite directions. We know that the equilib-
rium on-net price is always below the monopoly price. If this is also the case
for the o®-net price, the impact on pro¯ts of varying the access charge is
8Part (ii) of the lemma appears to contradict with LRTb, since the case of no call
externality is not excluded. On p. 48 they state that the o®-net price may decrease in a
if ¾ is not small enough, and give a numerical example for this. However, the values they
provide (´ = 2 and ¾ = c = m = 1) lead to the candidate equilibrium prices p11 = 1 = c
and p12 = 2. A small increase in a then does indeed decrease the o®-net price, but
simultaneously the on-net price falls below marginal cost and in this region any candidate
equilibrium is unstable and will therefore not be realized.
12ambiguous.9 If, however, the o®-net price is above the monopoly price, both
prices will move towards this monopoly price (and hence raise pro¯ts) only
if the access charge is lowered. Imagine ¯´ > 1. This is not an unrealistic
case, since ´ > 1 and ¯ may well be only slightly below 1. The slope of (3)
is then negative, and for ¾ > 0 we have p12 > (1 + m)pM in equilibrium.
Now let the access charge equal marginal termination cost, so m = 0. Then
the o®-net price exceeds the monopoly price, and we have the situation de-
scribed above. In order to maximize equilibrium pro¯ts, both networks will
negotiate an access charge a below c0.
If ¯´ = 1, the equilibrium o®-net price is (1+m)pM, independently of ¾.
For a = c0 then p12 is at the monopoly level, while p11 is below pM. Starting
from these values, a small decrease in a raises p11 towards the monopoly price
and thereby has a positive ¯rst-order e®ect on pro¯ts from on-net calls, but
only a second-order (negative) e®ect on pro¯ts from o®-net calls. In sum,
pro¯ts rise. By continuity this continues to hold if ¯´ is not too far below
1. This shows that networks may prefer an access discount even for ¯´ < 1.
For very low values of ¯, of course, this need not be the case.
Graphically, this can easily be seen if we keep in mind that since (4) is
independent from the access charge, networks can only shift the line (3) up
or down by varying the access charge. Thereby they can select any point
9In a symmetric equilibrium, access charges payed and received cancel out. Thus, the
relevant monopoly price for o®-net calls is based on technical marginal costs c, not on
perceived marginal costs (1 + m)c, and coincides with the monopoly price pM for on-net
calls.
13on (4), subject to the restriction m > ¡1. Maximizing pro¯ts, they will
choose the point where their isopro¯t curve is tangent to (4). The point of
tangency is unique, at least if ¾ is not too large, since (4) is convex in the
vicinity of p11 = pM and the equilibrium pro¯t function is quasi-concave in
equilibrium prices (the upper-contour sets of the isopro¯t curves are convex),
peaking at the \monopoly point" (1=pM;1=pM). It follows immediately that
the tangency point will lie northeast from the monopoly point, as illustrated
in Figure 1. This means that with the negotiated pro¯t-maximizing access
charge, both on- and o®-net prices are smaller than the monopoly price. If
the slope of (3) is negative or only slightly positive, of course, this implies
that this line intersects fp11 = pMg above the monopoly point. Hence [(1 +
m)pM]¡1 > (pM)¡1, or m < 0. This analysis proves the ¯rst part of the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix ¾ > 0 small enough. There exists 0 < k < 1 such that if
¯´ > k, networks will agree on an access discount, if ¯´ < k, networks will
negotiate an access markup, and if ¯´ = k, networks will agree on a = c0.
The case ¯ = 0 is the case without passive utility, and we could in prin-
ciple just refer to Proposition 2 of LRTb for the proof. In this proposition
they state that for small ¾ > 0 (and for ¯ = 0) the pro¯t maximizing access
charge exceeds c0. While this statement turns out to be true, unfortunately
their proof is °awed,10 so we give the correct proof here.
10In their proof, LRTb (p. 49) argue that for small ¾ > 0 their Lemma 2 shows that
14Proof: It su±ces to show that networks will negotiate a markup on access
if ¯ = 0. Given the analysis in the last paragraph, the second and third part
of this proposition then follow immediately from continuity of the negotiated
access charge in ¯´ and from the intermediate value theorem, respectively.
Note, that for a = c0 and ¯ = 0, the line (3) is the diagonal fp12 = p11g. By
symmetry of the equilibrium pro¯t function in p11 and p12, the slope of the
isopro¯t curves is equal to ¡1 along the diagonal. The slope of (4) at the
intersection with the diagonal, on the other hand, converges to ¡1 as the
point of intersection approaches the monopoly point, i.e. as ¾ ! 0. Thus,
for small ¾ the point of tangency is below the diagonal (see Figure 1), where
p11 < p12, and by the proportionality rule, m > 0, i.e. a markup on access,
is a necessary condition for this. QED
As noted, for small ¾ the pro¯t maximizing point of tangency lies below
the diagonal. Since networks will choose an access charge which lets this
point become an equilibrium, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If ¾ is positive but small and networks may cooperatively de-
termine the access charge, then the resulting equilibrium prices will show a
markup on o®-net calls.
both on-net and o®-net prices increase with the access charge. From this they infer that
starting from a = c0, a small increase in the access charge raises both prices toward the
monopoly level and therefore leads to higher pro¯ts. However, actually their Lemma 2
(correctly) states that for small ¾ > 0 the on-net price decreases in a. Hence it is not
obvious that an increase in a does indeed raise pro¯ts.
156.1 Welfare and the Socially Optimal Access Charge
From the social viewpoint, the optimal access charge is the access charge that




[(1 + ¯)u(q11) ¡ cq11 + (1 + ¯)u(q12) ¡ cq12]: (5)
To maximize welfare, the caller would have to be induced to extend the
length of his calls up to the point where marginal total utility created equals
marginal cost. This means (1 + ¯)u0(qij) = c and is induced by a price of
pij = (1+¯)¡1c. Of course these prices cannot be sustained in an equilibrium,
since they are below marginal cost for ¯ > 0.
Assume a benevolent regulator can set an arbitrary access charge subject
to the technical constraint a > ¡c0. By symmetry, the iso-welfare curves
surrounding the unconstrained optimum have a slope of ¡1 along the diag-
onal fp11 = p12g. Since the slope of (4) at the intersection with the diagonal
is smaller than ¡1 for small ¾, we can conclude that for small ¾ the point of
tangency of (4) and the iso-welfare curves lies above the diagonal, and there-
fore also above the pro¯t maximizing point on (4), as shown in Figure 1. This
means that the welfare maximizing access charge is below marginal cost and
also below the pro¯t-maximizing access charge. Moreover, we can show that
the welfare maximizing access charge might actually fall below zero. It fol-
lows from the additively separable form of (5) that the iso-welfare curves have
vertical tangents at p12 = c(1+¯)¡1. Since (4) becomes vertical at p11 = pM
for ¾ ! 0, the point of tangency approaches (1=pM;(1 + ¯)=c). Denoting
16the socially optimal access charge by aw, this implies that (1 + aw¡c0
c )pM
converges to c






. It can be seen that the sign of aw
depends on the relative size of ¯ and ´. Note that for ´ < 2
1¡¯ the expression
in brackets is negative, and so is aw. The pro¯t maximizing access charge
a¼, on the other hand, is always positive for small ¾ > 0. We summarize this
as follows.
Proposition 3 (i) aw < c0 for small ¾.
(ii) If ´ < 2
1¡¯, then aw < 0 < a¼ for small ¾.
(iii) If ´ > 2
1¡¯, then 0 < aw < a¼ for small ¾.
The more relevant of the cases (ii) and (iii) of this proposition seems
to be (ii), especially if we assume that ¯ is close to 1. Note that in this
case networks may actually agree on a \bill and keep" arrangement, setting
a = 0. This might result from the consideration that in existing mobile phone
networks, \bill and keep" helps to save transaction costs of interconnection,
a point not included in our model. If transaction costs are substantial and
were taken into account, \bill and keep" might indeed turn out to be pro¯t
maximizing. Note, however, that contrary to the view of Gans and King
(2001), from Proposition 3(ii) it follows that \bill and keep" is also welfare
improving compared with cost-based access pricing.
177 Discussion
Corroborating the ¯ndings of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003), and
others, this work emphasizes the point that collusion over the access charge
will result in access sold at a discount. Nevertheless, we seem not to en-
counter this phenomenon in existing mobile phone networks, and regulators
are usually struggling with bringing access charges down to cost.
The reason for this might be the nonexistence of a ¯xed-line network
in our models. Indeed, if networks are not allowed to price discriminate in
access, high access charges may well be the result of networks' incentives
to boost pro¯ts from incoming calls originating on the ¯xed-line network.
Alternatively, as Gans et al. (2004) suggest, even with price discrimination
in access, networks may agree to keep mobile-to-mobile access charges at high
levels in order to prevent customer arbitrage, i.e. consumers' substitution of
mobile-to-mobile calls with ¯xed-to-mobile calls. However, a detailed study
of these arguments is beyond the scope of this paper.
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